An Account of the Battle of Fort Stephenson

Continuing the Brunson memoir, which has some interesting perspectives on the Battle of Fort Stephenson from someone who was with Harrison's main force at Fort Seneca, a few miles up the Sandusky River:

While in this camp I so discharged my duties that on drill I was placed at the head of a platoon, in place of a commissioned officer; and I was so correct and full in my returns and reports as to be favorably reported to General Cass, who commanded our brigade, upon which, unsolicited, he promised me a lieutenancy. But, as the privates died off faster, in proportion, than the officers, no vacancy occurred, and I was left to serve out my time as I was.

While at Seneca, the Quarter-Master Sergeant asked me, one day, if I was not a Methodist. "Why," said I,  "what makes you think so?"

"Well, you mind your own business, perform your duties punctually, but never join in the amusements of the men, nor use any of their bad language."

"Yes, I am a Methodist."

 "Ah!" said he, "you will not be that long here."

"Why," I inquired, "are we not engaged in a lawful and honorable war? And why can not a man enjoy religion in the army, in such as case, as well as anywhere else?"

"That is all true," he said; "but as none, or very few, have done so, I conclude that you will do as the rest have done."

"Then," said I, "by the help of God I will make one exception; for I despise a man who will not maintain his integrity in the army, as well as any other lawful employment."

During the ensuing Winter this Sergeant was home on furlough, or the recruiting service. When he returned in the Spring to Detroit, at our first meeting, he said, "Well, Sergeant, I have made inquiry about you since my return, and am glad to find that you have kept your word, and maintained your religious integrity. It is an honor to you, and you are the more respected for it."

As I was now situated, my only opportunity for secret prayer, in form, was after all the men had retired. It was part of my duty to see that every non-commissioned officer and private soldier in the company was in his tent at tattoo, or nine o'clock, P.M.; and , as all was then still, I retired behind the breastwork, and had my formal secret devotions, being obliged to do it mentally at other hours of the day. I had my Bible with me, and read a portion of it every day; and, finding a few men who had once had some knowledge of religion, though now in a backslidden state, I conversed with them on religious subjects, as often as opportunity occurred. 

As before stated, the country was infested with Indians, accompanied by British regulars, and we expected an attack every night, for ten days. General Harrison said that his spies reported five thousand regulars, and six thousand Indians, on the way for that purpose; and knowing that his army of twenty-five hundred men could not resist eleven thousand, he had made a requisition on Governor Meigs, of Ohio, for four thousand militia, who were on their march to assist us. But the spies reported that the enemy had left Fort Meigs, on the Maumee River, and were heading toward our camp. In view of the near approach of the enemy, the General thought it prudent to fall back toward Upper Sandusky, till he met Governor Meigs, with his reinforcement, and then return to the fight; but he could not retreat and leave Major Croghan at Fort Stephenson, with one hundred and forty-three men, where, with such a force against them, they must be cut off.

[Any casual student of the War of 1812 will recognize that these numbers are all out of whack-- General Procter's army never numbered over 800 men, and the Indians under Tecumseh not much more than that. The Americans outnumbered the British and Indians at nearly every engagement during the 1813 campaign. Harrison's apparent cowardice during the second Siege of Fort Meigs and the attack at Fort Stephenson, was probably due to two factors: one, that his troops at Fort Seneca were mostly raw recruits from the one-year regiments, the 26th, 27th, and 28th Infantry, and two, he expected the attack on Fort Stephenson to be bait to lure him into a trap-- marching out of his entrenchments at Fort Seneca, Harrison's army would get pounced on by Tecumseh and his Indians.]

The General, therefore, sent an express to the Major to burn his fort, and every thing in it that his men could not carry on their backs, and retreat on the east side of the river, so as to be at Seneca at reveille the next morning. But it so happened--fortunately, as it turned out--that the express missed his way, got lost in the woods, and did not reach the Major till the next day, at ten o'clock, A.M.

In the meantime everything was prepared at Seneca for a retreat at reveille that morning. All the provisions, stores, tents, and everything that could not be carried on men's backs, were to be burned. The men were supplied with extra rations, to eat on the way, and but little sleep was had during the night. But morning came, and no troops from the little fort. It would not do to retreat, and leave them. A council of war was called to decide what should be done. The men were restless, and discontented at the idea of a retreat; and the officers seemed to be of the same state of mind; all preferring to meet the enemy at our breastworks, and try our skill and fortune in a battle, despite the odds in numbers. At length, when General Cass was asked his opinion, he said, "General, you are in command; you must do as you think best." "But," said Harrison, "two heads are better than one, and I want your opinion." "Well, it is my opinion, then, that we would better not retreat till we see something to retreat from." This settled the question; and every man was set at work to strengthen our defenses, and prepare for the worst.

The Major, knowing that the failure of the express to reach him in time to obey the order, would thwart the General's designs, and that he must wait for further orders; and as his own spies had reported only hundreds where the General's had reported thousands, he believed that he could defend the little fort, if attacked, before another order could be received. As he had to wait for further orders, he sent the express back, with this letter: "I have men enough, ammunition enough, and provisions enough; and damn me if I quit the fort."

The express reached headquarters, with this insolent letter, about sundown. The General, of course, was nettled. The Major was a pet of his; had been in service with him through the war, from Tippecanoe to this time; and to get such a letter from his pet, was rather too much for friendship to bear; and, besides, subordination must be preserved, or the army would be ruined. So, the next morning, Colonel Wells was ordered to the command of the little fort, and Colonel Ball, with his two hundred dragoons, was ordered to escort him down to it, and bring up Major Croghan under arrest. About noon the order was executing, and the little Major, only nineteen years of age, was brought into camp a prisoner.

 [The Major was actually 22 years old]

The General was, naturally, very nervous, and excitement very much quickened his motions and his words. When the Major appeared before him he sprang to his feet, and with vehemence, said, "Major Croghan, how came you to send me that insolent letter?"

"Why, General, didn't the express explain it?"

"Explain it! What explanation can be given to such a letter as that?"

"Why, General, didn't he tell you that he didn't get there till yesterday morning, at ten o'clock?"

 "Yes, he told me that. But what has that to do with this letter?"

"Why, you know I couldn't evacuate the fort, and get here by reveille of the morning previous."

"Of course not."

 "Well, I knew that your plans must be thwarted, by the circumstance, and that I must wait for further orders; and, believing that I was completely invested by the enemy, and that the express and the letter would fall into his hands, I determined, if it did, to send him as bullying a one as possible. But I told the express, the damned rascal, that if he got through with it, to explain it to you. Didn't he do it, General?"

"No, he didn't."

"Why, General, you know that I understand my business, and the duties of a subordinate, too well to send you such a letter, under any other circumstances." 

"Why, certainly, I thought so; and that was the mystery of the case. But how could I understand it without an explanation? and with this I am satisfied." And before night the Major was restored to his command, and Colonel Wells recalled to his.

There were some speculations among the officers as to the Major's explanation. Some thought that he believed his own spies to have correct numbers of the enemy, despite the report of the General's spies, and that with his advantages he could whip them,  and that he expected the attack before the General could arrest him; if successful, the victory would place him above censure; if not, it would make no difference, as he would be either dead or a prisoner. But the most probable reason for his course was that given be himself, though he disapproved of the proposed retreat. As the matter turned out, in two days after his return, he fought the memorable battle of Fort Stevenson, having but one hundred and forty-three men to repulse eleven hundred of the enemy. Of the British regulars, some fifty were killed in, or near, the ditch; but of the wounded no report could be made, as they retreated. But soon after the battle a British surgeon came, with a flag of flag of truce, to attend to their wounded, expecting to find at least one hundred and fifty, as but three hundred of the five hundred that left Malden got back to it, showing a loss of two hundred, somewhere. On this information the General sent out Indian scouts to scour the woods between the little fort and the lake. They picked up and brought in about twenty, and reported a large number of dead bodies, and bones, and uniforms, indicating the death of as many, who perished in their retreat....

[Here Brunson explains that as it turned out, General Procter was expecting to capture only the stockade at Fort Stephenson, in part for flour and provisions he needed for his army, and for the morale boost of another victory against the Americans. But when his scouts reported that the Americans were encamped at nearby Fort Seneca, with 2500 men, he realized that he had to end the siege quickly and decided to attack the fort directly. What's more, Procter had bombarded the stockade with field artillery (six-pounder guns and 6-inch howitzers) and thought the wood pickets had been weakened. The American six-pounder gun, "Old Betsy", had been removed from its original position in order to make the British think it had been dismounted-- instead it was secretly placed in a blockhouse near the "weakened" section of pickets in position to rake the ditch. With a double charge of canister, it swept the entire length of the ditch several times and effectively ended the British charge.

 ...While the battle was raging at Fort Stevenson, the booming of the cannon reached our ears at Seneca, and our men showed unmistakable signs of uneasiness and discontent at the thought of so many of us having no part in the fray. Some mumurings would break out, because they were not led to the scene of action, and some fears were expressed as to the fate of that little band of brave men. It was but a few hours, however, until the suspense was at an end, for a foaming steed came into camp, and the rider handed a letter to the General, giving a brief statement of the affair, and then followed a deafening roar of shouts and rejoicing. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On Blockhouses

War of 1812 block houses in Mansfield (top) and Fort Meigs (bottom).

From Practical Instructions for Military Officers: Comprehending a Concise System of Military Geometry, Field Fortification and Tactics of Riflemen and Light Infantry . Also the Scheme for Forming a Corps of a Partisan, and Carrying on the Petite Guerre ... to which is Annexed, a New Military Dictionary ... published 1811 by Epaphras Hoyt.

NEXT to an acquaintance with the field exercises and duties of the camp, no part of military- science is of more importance to An officer than for fortification: for without some knowledge of this, how will he be capable of throwing up a work for the defense of a post, or detachment, entrusted to his command when he has not with him an engineer? A thousand instances of this kind will occur in the course of service 4 and an -officer would be extremely mortified, should he be compelled to surrender to an enemy, when a little acquaintance with fortification would have enabled him to construct a temporary redoubt, or other small work sufficient for his defense, till he could be relieved by his general.

Another work with which a post may be fortified* and which affords a formidable defense against musketry, is a block-house. In new countries, where timber is plenty, these are constructed expeditiously.

These houses are usually built two stories high; with hewed logs of sufficient thickness to resist musket shot ; the ends are locked together in the manner of the common log houses in new settlements,- and the upper story is made to project about three feet beyond the walls of the lower story. Loop-holes are made in the projection, to fire on the enemy without, and also in the floor of the upper story, to fire on him should he gain the lower apartment. Loop-holes are also made in the walls of both stories* to annoy the enemy in his approach these should be made 3 or 4 inches wide on the exterior, and 6 or 7 on the interior side ; the length up and down 15 inches, and four and an half feet from the floors, and sufficiently numerous for one half of the men to fire at once. These holes are sometimes made wide on the outside and narrow within, like an embrasure but it is evident, that the shot from the enemy will be much more likely to enter, by glancing on the tides of the aperture, than when the narrow side is outward. 

If the house is furnished with cannon, port-holes must be pierced in the walls,at the angles, sufficient to admit the muzzles of the guns. These, as well as the loop holes, may be stopped with billets of wood fitted to them, but in such a manner that they may be cleared for action without the least delay. The communication between the two apartments may be simply a ladder, pasting through a trap-door in the upper floor. The outer door should be musket proof, and so constructed that it may be firmly fastened on the inside. The building may be furnished with a chimney, and each room with a fire-place for cooking. When other materials cannot be procured, the chimney may be built with small sticks well covered with clay mortar. The roof may be composed of boards and mingles, or when these cannot be procured, bark from the trees in the vicinity may be substituted. A block-house, built in this manner, and well calked, to keep out the air, affords a comfortable- residence in cold weather. It surrounded with palisades, it will make a better defense. Fig. 55, plate 7, is a view of a block-house, the lower room furnished with cannon and port-holes at the angles. The background exhibits a view of a mountainous country, and a river passing near the house ; over the river is a bridge of boats, the house serving as a tete de pont.

 The blockhouse in Hoyt's manual.

"He was a beardless stripling..." one veterans recollections of Fort Stephenson and Major Croghan

As a follow up to my series on the Battle of Fort Stephenson, here's a letter written by a veteran of the Petersburg, Virginia Volunteers, probably to Colonel Webb C. Hayes (1856-1934, son of President Rutherford B. Hayes and grandson of Private James Webb who served in Colonel Ball's dragoons as a member of the Kentucky Bourbon Blues light dragoon company). It was published in "The Croghan Celebration", Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society Quarterly 16 no. 1 (January 1907).

Petersburg, VA., 4^th March 1880

Colonel:

            According to promise I will now attempt to tell you what little I know about Croghan and Sandusky. The opening of the spring campaign in 1813 found the garrison of Fort Meigs exceedingly weak. General Harrison having gone in the states to hasten forward reinforcements, leaving General Clay in command. The British and Indians in considerable numbers, knowing perhaps of the absence of the General-in-Chief, and our weakness, as also our expecting succor from Kentucky, surrounded the fort and engaged in a sham battle, hoping by this ruse to draw us out. Failing in this they left us, taking the Military Road in the direction of Fort Stephenson, which was said to have been forty miles in length, and fell upon Major Croghan and his little band at Sandusky. The fort at this place was quite small, covering I should say not more than one English acre of ground. In form it was quadrilateral, without traverses, but having in front of curtain on its four sides a broad and deep fosse. At the north-east angle of the fort was a blockhouse, and just here was mounted the only cannon (a six pounder) which made such havoc with the red coats occupying the ditch. My impression is that my old comrade Brown was the only member of my company present on that occasion; and that he did not (as has been asserted) command the piece but only assisted in working it. The captain of the gun was a sergeant either of the Pittsburgh Blues, or the Greensburg Blues. However Brown was terribly burned about the face which disfigured him for life. I forgot to state that the Fort was short of ammunition of all sorts, having only three rounds in all for the cannon. You ask if I knew Major Croghan. I answer, Yes, I have seen him oftentimes before and after the glorious fight at Sandusky. He was a beardless stripling; I should say rather below the medium size, and did not look more than eighteen years of age. This is about all I know of Croghan and Sandusky. I might add, though not exactly pertinent, that our Company was quite largely represented on the decks of Commodore Perry’s ships, when he so gloriously fought and overcame the British Fleet on Lake Erie.

            With great respect,

                                    Your obedient servant,

                                                            Reuben Clements.

Mr. Clements had outlived not only the War of 1812, but had been witness to the Siege of Petersburg from 1864 to 1865, during which the famous Battle of the Crater, 150 years ago this year, took place in the same neighborhood as a monument to the 1812 volunteers of the "cockade city."

The Battle of Fort Stephenson-Part Three

[The third part of my series on the Battle of Fort Stephenson, which was fought at modern-day Fremont Ohio on August 3rd, 1813.]

The famous cannon today.

The old dent on the breech which allowed Thomas L. Hawkins to identify the French and Indian War-era gun after the war.

...At about 5pm the time of decision arrived. Croghans men on the walls glimpsed scarlet coats through the gunsmoke, but not until they were only 20 paces from the stockade did the Americans spot a massive, close-packed column of 350 Englishmen. The column was headed by light infantry company of the regiment. Croghan's men were ready for them. Their loopholes erupted with musketry and the sudden rain of small arms fire staggered the column for a moment. Lt. Colonel William Short, who was heading up the column, quickly rallied his men and urged them to follow him forward into the ditch. Lacking scaling ladders and faced with the bayonets on the intact wooden stockade, Short and his men tried to hack the timber down with axes, even as the defenders continued to shoot down into their crowded ditch at point-blank range.

            At this moment, the port-hole that no one had been able to see from the British lines creaked open, and a black muzzle rolled out. There must have been a flash of light and flame, and the searing streaks of hundreds of iron slugs, but most of the Englishmen in the ditch had no time to see or hear it. A six-pounder cannon could be reloaded just as fast as a musket, and within tens of seconds a second blast swept the ditch. Within minutes, every man who had entered the ravine was either wounded or dead. The survivors of the column fled to safety.         Colonel Short was dead, as was Lieutenant J. G. Gordon who was badly wounded by a large caliber ball from a wall piece, and was hacking at the pickets with his sword when the same gun blew his brains out.[1] Major Adam Muir, who had led many of the British operations over the past year, was badly wounded but dragged from the scene by Indians. On the opposite side of the fort, another infantry column led by Lt. Colonel Wharburton advanced, but raked with rapid musket fire and realizing the main attack had failed, these men too retreated back towards safety. Within 30 minutes, the battle for Fort Stephenson was over. The Americans had lost a total of seven men slightly wounded, in addition to their earlier fatality.

A Missed Opportunity?

            The remaining British forces embarked and sailed from Lower Sandusky after dusk. A couple of British deserters made it into the stockade at 3am to inform Major Croghan of their retreat. General Procter's small western forces lost, according to his account, a total of 26 dead, 41 wounded, and 29 captured soldiers in the attack.[2] He blamed the Indians and the officers of the Indian Department for forcing him to attack. “Impossibilities being attempted, failed,” he later reported, and added that Croghans men had put up “the severest fire I ever saw” on the attacking columns. The Indians, who had been expected to support the assault, faded away as they saw it fail.[3]

            Many of the attackers were trapped in the ditch, either too wounded to escape or pinned down by the American fire. While the battle was still ongoing, the garrison cut gaps in the picketing to aid the mass of wounded men lying only a few feet from the walls. As August 3 dawned, the Americans collected 70 muskets and several sets of pistols from around the fort, as well as a boat laden with clothing and military stores, left behind by the British in their hasty retreat. Croghan set his surgeon to assisting the wounded as best he could.

            General Procter had left the neighborhood of Fort Stephenson so fast that some of his men, who had lost their way after the failed assault were picked up later near Lake Erie by General Harrison’s Indian scouts.[4] Procter had good reason to move quickly. Many Americans in Harrison's army saw an opportunity to counterattack and trap the British force even as they were attacking Fort Stephenson. The phlegmatic Virginian ordered his men to stand fast, to their chagrin. He awaited the arrival of 250 mounted volunteers from the Ohio settlements. Moreover, there was every evidence that his nemesis Tecumseh remained perched in the Black Swamp, waiting for Harrison and his untrained recruits to bungle through.

            As soon as he had word on August 3 that the British were gone, Harrison now changed his mind and rode out at the head of Colonel Ball's dragoons, anxious to catch them before they escaped to the lake. Generals McArthur and Cass followed with their infantry regiments. It soon became apparent that the main force had already returned to Malden, and ever fearful of an Indian ambush, the general ordered most of his forces back into camp at Fort Seneca.

            There remained for the Americans the problem of the wounded. On visiting Fort Stephenson the day after the attack, General Harrison set his hospital surgeon to treating them, including many British soldiers whose condition was quite serious. General Procter sent Lt. John Le Breton of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment with a surgeon to the fort under a flag of truce.[5] When they arrived on August 10, Major Croghan forwarded Procter's letter appealing to General Harrison to allow his men medical attention to Fort Seneca. Procter also asked that his non-wounded prisoners be released on parole.

            Harrison, who may have been piqued that Procter was implying the Americans would not treat wounded British prisoners with humanity, replied curtly that the British soldiers were being treated by his own surgeon “according to those principles which are held sacred in the American army.”[6] The Americans had seen their wounded abandoned and massacred by their opponents. One of Harrison's own surgeons had been imprisoned by Procter himself in a similar situation, after his guide had been murdered by one of Procter's allies. The unwritten rebuke in Harrison's cordial note, sent back with Lt. Le Breton and the surgeon, must have been unmistakable.

            As the drama on the Sandusky concluded, word arrived for the Americans in camp at “Sink-a-Town” (Seneca Town) that Master Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry's squadron had  sortied from its shipyards and refuge behind Presque Isle at Erie, Pennsylvania. Perry's two 18-gun brigs had tipped the balance of power on Lake Erie solidly towards the Americans, and the British fleet had fled for safety in its own refuge on the Detroit River. The stage was set for the battle that would decide the campaign. It would be fought not in swamp or forest, but on the inland seas.

---

[1]Letter of W. B. T Webb, reprinted in Sandusky County Historical Society, History Leaflet No. 4 (September 1963) (http://www.sandusky-county-scrapbook.net/FtSteph/SoldLtr.htm accessed 6/2/14.)

[2]Alec R. Gilpin, The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest (East Lansing, Michigan: The Michigan State University Press, 1958), 207.

[3]MPHC 15, 347-48.

[4]Esarey, 523.

[5]Ibid., 518.

[6]Esarey, 521.

The Battle of Fort Stephenson-Part Two

Continuing the narrative of the siege and battle of Fort Stephenson on August 1-2 1813

No sooner did the young major arrive back at his little command, than word came back from General Harrison's lookouts that a large flotilla had been spotted sailing up Sandusky Bay on the evening of July 31. By noon on August 1 they had made it back as far as Fort Stephenson, where they informed Major Croghan before hurrying south to tell General Harrison. Only a few hours later, the first large group of Indians appeared on the river bluff opposite the fort. Croghan ordered the volunteers manning “old betsy” to open fire, which drove the Indians away. Only a half hour later, several gunboats flying British colors appeared in the river. The Indians reappeared in every direction round the stockade. Retreat was now certainly out of the question.

            British regulars from the 41^st Regiment disembarked from their boats about a mile downstream from the fort. A 5 ½ inch howitzer was manhandled up the opposite shore. Soon, a white flag of truce appeared from the treeline outside the stockade. It was borne by two men in the uniforms of British officers, who turned out to be Major Robert Dickson of the Indian Department and Major Peter Chambers of the 41^st. Major Dickson was an imposing presence, a burly Scot named “Red Head” by the western Indians for his bright red hair and beard. He had orchestrated the successful attack on Fort Mackinac the previous year, and had gathered thousands of fierce western tribesmen for the attack at Fort Meigs and now Fort Stephenson. To meet them, Croghan sent out his youngest officer, Ensign Edmund Shipp.

            Major Chambers made the usual demand in such circumstances for the Americans to surrender “to spare the effusion of blood.” Shipp replied that Croghan and his garrison were determined to defend the fort to the last extremity—or to bury themselves in its ruins. Dickson replied that it was a pity that so fine a young man should fall into the hands of the “savages”-- “Sir, for God's sake surrender, and prevent the dreadful massacre that will be caused by your resistance.” Shipp answered, “When the fort is taken there will be none left to massacre. It will not be given up while a man is able to resist.”

            At that, their conference was interrupted when an Indian leaped out from the cover of a nearby ravine, ran to the American and tried to grab his sword. Major Dickson stepped up to defend Ensign Shipp, and anxiously ushered him back towards the safety of the stockade. The parley was over.

A close up of the layout of the fort. B blockhouse at top center was where "old Betsy" was hidden. Note the extra curtain wall where the fort was expanded into a rectangle. The plateau where the fort was constructed is now the location of the Fremont Public Library.

Major George Croghan in the uniform of Major, 17th Infantry.

            The British opened fire immediately after their envoys returned to their lines. 6- and 12- pounders from their gunboats thundered, while the single 5 ½ howitzer occupied  the heights which had worried Harrison and his staff so much. The shelling continued into the evening, but without much effect. The British simply did not have heavy guns enough to threaten the stockade. They did cause some damage, particularly to Croghan's warehouse, which was demolished by the howizter shells. At dawn the following day, the garrison discovered three 6-pounders in the brink of a ravine only 250 yards north of their walls. The British began to fire these guns, letting the recoil roll them back into the ravine where the gunners could load under cover. The 6-pound shot made little impact of the logs of the stockade. Croghan's only casualty, however, occurred when an over-eager infantryman, perhaps a private from the 24^th Regiment, climbed to the top of a blockhouse for a potshot at the artillerists. A well-aimed cannonball took his head off.

            Croghan had a limited supply of shot on hand for his only 6-pounder, and ordered the crew to husband it carefully. By 4pm he realized that most of the British fire was concentrated against the northwest corner of the fort. Gathering as many hands as he could spare from the wall, he ordered his men to stack sacks of flour, sand and other debris against the stockade there to reinforce it. It seemed the British were planning on throwing an assault against this section of the fort. Croghan's garrison was well prepared. Most of them were experienced infantrymen, armed with the .69 caliber Springfield pattern muskets ubiquitous among American soldiers. Several companies of Pennsylvania militia had left their muskets behind at the fort as they mustered out, and with these Croghan was able to give each man one or two extra loaded muskets. The extra bayonets had been nailed pointing downwards from the top of the wall, and traps were set with logs and other deadfalls at likely points.

            The ace up Major Croghan's sleeve was his cannon. The gun crew was ordered to stop firing when a well-placed shot passed through its original location in a blockhouse, as if the British had dismounted and silenced it. Then the volunteers hauled “old betsy” into a different blockhouse on the northwest corner, behind a hidden gunport, which covered the ditch on that side of the stockade. They charged it with a double load of canister, essentially making it into a giant shotgun. Led by Sergeant Brown of the Volunteers, the crew silently waited their turn to reply to the British cannonade.

            In the heat of the August afternoon the smoke of the bombardment collected and settled like a fog bank. As they listened to the bombardment 10 miles away at Fort Seneca, Private Northcutt and his comrades chafed at being kept out of the fight, thinking it “an extreme hard case that Croghan should be cooped up with a handful of men to be massacred by the British while Harrison was lying in hearing of him with fifteen hundred men, and would not go and help him.”[1] Instead, the general, whose army had been considerably strengthened with the arrival of General Duncan McArthur's 28^th Infantry and other elements, set fatigue parties to digging trenches and other fortifications. His pickets were constantly harassed by Indians, though. “Every time during the day that I not out on duty the guard would fire and run in. One fellow swore that he saw two Indians and was so close to them as to see their blankets rolled up and hopperesed on their backs.”[2]

            After the battle, and indeed long after the war Harrison would be blamed for not marching to the relief of Fort Stephenson. However, he believed that while the British surrounded Croghan, Tecumseh and thousands of well-seasoned warriors lurked in the swamps and forests between them. Marching out with his mostly green regulars would have been an invitation to a third massive defeat at their hands. Perhaps the general also realized that the reports from downstream were not from heavy guns, 18- and 24-pounders that were capable of knocking down the little fort. With only light guns threatening their walls, Croghan's detachment was just as snug as it would have been with Harrison's army present.

---

[1]Northcutt, 334.

[2]Ibid.

The Battle of Fort Stephenson-Part One

Here's an excerpt from my book project, a narrative of the Batle of Fort Stephenson which took place at modern-day Fremont 201 years ago this August:

Throughout the siege of Fort Meigs General Harrison had waited, impatiently, with the balance of his army at Lower Sandusky: he had no more than 300 regulars with him, of whom more than 150 were posted forward at the lower ford of the Sandusky River in a stockade called Fort Stephenson. He made a new headquarters at a friendly Indian village called Seneca Town, a few miles to the south along the river. He was waiting for Governor Meigs' Ohio volunteers to arrive, as well as the two Ohio 12-months regular regiments under Generals Duncan McArthur and Lewis Cass.

            Fort Stephenson was a square timber stockade with two blockhouses and a gatehouse that stood on a low bluff overlooking the lowest ford of the Sandusky River, about 20 miles upriver from Sandusky Bay. A government post before the war, it had been fortified by the Ohio brigade of General Simon Perkins late in 1812. Sometime later it had been expanded with the simple expedient of adding a second square enclosure to the first, making the fort into a rectangle with room for a small warehouse and some huts for soldiers and teamsters. It stood as a waypoint along Harrison's military road, a crossroads with trails leading west to Fort Meigs, north to Lake Erie, and east to Cleveland and Erie. A rotating series of militia and regular soldiers formed the garrison.

            General Harrison thought that Fort Meigs being too strong to fall to such forces as General Procter could bring against it, the British commander might try his luck against the Lower Sandusky. With his staff, including Captain Eleazar D Wood of the engineers and Major George Croghan of the 17^th Infantry, the general inspected Fort Stephenson. It became apparent that the opposite bank of the river was actually higher ground than that occupied by the stockade. The fort would have to be razed and rebuilt on the opposite bluff if it was to be expected to survive a siege or bombardment.

            When word arrived that Procter and Tecumseh were out in force, Harrison decided there was no time to make Fort Stephenson defensible. He took a handful of infantry, about 140 infantrymen and retreated upriver to the fortified Camp Seneca. Major Croghan was left to hold Fort Stephenson with Captain James Hunter's Company of the 17^th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Benjamin Johnson commanding Captain Duncan's Company of the 17^th, and scraps and volunteers from other units including the 7^th and 24^th Infantry Regiments and a half dozen men from the Petersburgh Volunteers and Pittsburgh Blues. These men totaled about 160 muskets. There was also an old iron six-pounder which the men believed to date back to the French and Indian Wars, with a prominent dent in the breech made, perhaps, by an enemy shot. The garrison affectionately nicknamed the piece “old bess” and Croghan placed it in the charge of a sergeant and men from the Volunteers, who had some experience with artillery.

            Harrison's orders to Croghan were to defend the stockade if a force made up solely of Indians approached, since with small arms alone they would have no way of reducing the fort. However, if British forces accompanied by artillery arrived up the Sandusky, the general instructions were to burn the post and its contents and retreat south to Fort Seneca. Fort Stephenson, after all, only held 200 barrels of flour and perhaps a hundred stacks of arms-nothing worth sacrificing two companies of infantry for. These orders were to lead to a misunderstanding between Harrison and his young protege, and would eventually become a source of controversy for decades after the war.

            Shortly after posting Croghan at Lower Sandusky, and sending scouts to watch the Lake Erie shoreline for signs of the British squadron, General Harrison received large reinforcements in the form of Colonel James V Ball's squadron of Light Dragoons, nearly 200 strong, as well as Colonel George Paull's newly-recruited 27^th Infantry Regiment to make about 600 effectives at Fort Seneca.

            On July 29, Harrison's scouts reported sightings of Indians in the vicinity of Fort Stephenson and Fort Seneca. When word arrived that the siege of Fort Meigs had been lifted, Harrison believed that General Procter would probably try to attack a weaker post such as Fort Stephenson at Lower Sandusky or Fort Huntington at Cleveland. The general called upon William Conner, a volunteer Indian scout who in civilian life was a trader in the Indiana Territory. Conner had grown up with his Moravian parents among the Delaware tribe of Ohio, and had known the Lower Sandusky area as a youth. He was given a written message to give to Major Croghan which read:

Sir. Immediately on receiving this letter, you will abandon Fort Stephenson, set fire to it, and repair with your command this night to headquarters. Cross the river and come up on the opposite side. If you should deem and find it impractical to make good your march to this place, take the road to Huron and pursue it with the utmost circumspection and dispatch.[1]

            However, William Conner did not remember the wilderness trails along the Sandusky River as well as he had thought, or perhaps in the darkness and with hostile Indians to evade the going was much slower than he had anticipated. Either way, he did not reach Fort Stephenson with the orders until noon the following day. By then, Major Croghan had observed significant numbers of Indians in the brush surrounding the stockade and its outbuildings. Retreat would invite a massacre, and besides, hadn't Harrison ordered him to stay put in case of an investment by Indians alone? He scribbled a short note for Conner to take back in reply to Harrison:

Sir, I have just received yours of yesterday, 10 o'clock PM ordering me to destroy this place and make good my retreat, which was received too late to be carried into execution. We have determined to defend this place, and by heavens we can.[2]

            When Harrison read this he was outraged. The young Croghan had apparently defied a direct order and thus placed his detachment in peril—and Harrison himself in danger of having his own name attached to a third military disaster not wholly of his own making. He lost no time in dispatching Colonel Ball with his entire squadron to relieve Croghan of his command, and to leave Colonel Samuel Wells of the 17^th Infantry in command of the fort. Croghan would be placed under arrest and court-martialled. There was a card left in George Croghan's hand yet: long a friend of the general's, he had served as aide-de-camp to Harrison during the Tippecanoe campaign. When Colonel John Boyd of the 4^th Infantry Regiment charged Harrison with neglecting to fortify the American camp, Croghan defended his commander. Once face to face with the general, he might be able to make an explanation for his insubordination.

            Meantime, Colonel Ball did not reach Lower Sandusky unmolested. As his dragoons trotted along the river road, handsomely attired in blue coats with silver buttons and leather helmets with long white plumes, the outriders of the advance guard were fired upon by Indians lurking in sparse woodlands on the west side of the road. One of the scouts was wounded, but Ball ordered the main body of his squadron to charge. Mounted on a better horse than his enlisted troopers,  Ball soon outpaced them. Overtaking two Indians, he rode between them and hacked down the one on the right with his saber. The other one swung at him with a tomahawk which narrowly missed his back, and buried itself in his saddle. A corporal following on the colonel's heels shot the other Indian down.

            Lieutenant James Hedges was riding down another warrior when his stirrup broke, spilling him on top of the Indian. Both men tumbled to the ground, and then sprang to their feet. Dodging a tomahawk blow, “Hedges struck the Indian across the head, and as he was falling buried his sword up to its hilt in his body.[3]” Captain Samuel Hopkins of the 2^nd US Light Dragoons had a similar close call when an Indian he was pursuing swiped at him with a tomahawk, making his horse swerve and nearly dismounting him. The warrior fought off another trooper who came up to Hopkin's assistance, but was finally killed by a third trooper.    There turned out to be only twenty warriors in this party watching the road, and all or nearly all of them were cut down in this unequal contest. As Private William B. Northcutt of Gerrard's Company of Volunteer Light Dragoons (the Bourbon Blues) recalled:

The first thing the Indians knew of the squadron they were right under our broadswords and we made their heads rattle like old gourds. They caught their guns in both hands and gabbered something I suppose about quarters, but we were Kentuckians and did not understand one word about the Indian language, and we gobbled them up right on the spot.[4]

            Here there was a reversal of roles as the troopers, most of whom came from Kentucky as volunteers or regulars, looted the bodies and took trophies. One of Private Northcutt's messmates asked if he should cut the scalp from an Indian he had killed, but Northcutt talked him out of it. Later, on the return trip to Fort Seneca Northcutt picked up a blanket bundle and medicine bag belonging to one of the dead Indians. He later gave the medicine bag to one of Harrison's Indian allies, whom the Kentuckians referred to as “Harrison's pets.” These allied scouts later went back and buried their enemies, and reported that one of them had limped away, wounded, according to the signs they had read on the battleground.

            The squadron arrived at Lower Sandusky without further incident, and Croghan was replaced with Colonel Wells and escorted back to headquarters. When he arrived, Croghan explained that he felt the Indians had surrounded him in force, making it dangerous to retreat from the post. Colonel Ball's brief skirmish could attest to that much. The blustering and confidednt tone of the note had been meant to deceive any British officer who might intercept it—as had occurred in three separate incidents already in the war.[5] Harrison accepted this explanation at face value, and sent Croghan back to Fort Stephenson with another heavy escort.

---

[1]McAffee, 322.

[2]McAfee, 323.

[3]“The Croghan Celebration,” in Ohio Archeological and Historical Quarterly 16, no. 1 (January 1907), 47.

[4]William B. Northcutt, “War of 1812 Diary of William B. Northcutt,” ed. G. Glenn Clift, in Register of the Kentucky State Historical Society 56 no. 3 (July 1958), 332-333.

[5]Most famously, General Isaac Brock intercepted and read General William Hull's papers when the schooner Cayuga was captured on June 30, 1812. Then, another mail pouch fell into Brock's hands after the skirmish at Brownstown on August 4. Finally, the mail pouch to Fort Meigs was captured during the siege in May 1813. Each of these incidents provided valuable intelligence for British commanders.